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In the literature, existence of equilibria for discrete-time mean field games has been in general established
via Kakutani’s Fixed Point Theorem. However, this fixed point theorem does not entail any iterative scheme
for computing equilibria. In this paper, we first propose a Q-iteration algorithm to compute equilibria for
mean-field games with known model using Banach Fixed Point Theorem. Then, we generalize this algorithm
to model-free setting using fitted Q-iteration algorithm and establish the probabilistic convergence of the
proposed iteration. Then, using the output of this learning algorithm, we construct an approximate Nash
equilibrium for finite-agent stochastic game with mean-field interaction between agents.
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1. Introduction
We consider the learning of approximate Nash equilibria for stochastic dynamic games with a large
number of identical agents in a mean-field interaction. The typical approach for studying such game
models is to go to the infinite-population limit of the problem. This corresponds to considering
mean-field games (MFG), which have been introduced by Huang, Malhame´, and Caines [23] and
Lasry and Lions [25] to establish the existence of approximate Nash equilibria for continuous-time
differential games with a large number of agents interacting through a mean-field term.
In mean-field games, a generic agent solves a Markov decision processes (MDP) with a con-
straint on the distribution of the state at each time step. The notion of equilibrium in the infinite-
population limit is the mean-field equilibrium, which consists of a pair of a policy and a state
measure. In order to be an equilibrium solution, this pair should satisfy Nash certainty equivalence
(NCE) principle [23] which states that, under a given state measure, the policy should be optimal
and when the generic agent applies this policy, the resulting distribution of the agent’s state is
same as the state measure. In continuous-time setting, solution of a Fokker-Planck equation evolv-
ing forward in time and a Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation evolving backward in time gives the
mean-field equilibrium.
Under mild assumptions, one can prove that the policy in mean-field equilibrium constitutes an
approximate Nash equilibrium for a finite-agent setting when the number of agents is sufficiently
large. We refer the reader to [22, 35, 21, 5, 8, 9, 16, 28] for studies of continuous-time mean-
field games with different models and cost functions, such as games with major-minor players,
risk-sensitive games, games with Markov jump parameters, and LQG games.
Compared to continuous-time setting, discrete-time mean-field games have not been studied
much in the literature. Reference [15] studies a discrete-time mean-field game with a finite state
space over a finite horizon. In [1], discrete-time mean-field game with countable state-space is
studied under an infinite-horizon discounted cost criterion. References [13, 26, 29, 27] consider
discrete-time mean-field games with linear state dynamics. References [32, 34] consider a discrete-
time mean-field game with Polish state and action spaces under the discounted cost optimality
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criterion for fully-observed case and partially-observed case, respectively. In [33], authors consider
a discrete-time risk-sensitive mean-field game with Polish state and action spaces. References [6,
38, 37, 31] study discrete-time mean-field games subject to the average cost optimality criterion.
We note that the aforementioned works have only established the existence of mean-field equi-
librium and no algorithm with convergence guarantee, even for known models, has been proposed
to compute this mean-field equilibrium. In our recent work [2], we study this problem for a very
general class of models. We propose a value iteration algorithm and prove the convergence of this
algorithm to the mean-field equilibrium. In this current paper, we generalize this algorithm to the
model-free setting using fitted Q-learning [4]. Here, we use fitted Q-learning instead of the classical
Q-learning algorithm because the action space is assumed to be a compact and convex subset of
a finite dimensional Euclidean space. Convexity of the action space is quite necessary to establish
that the operator in the value iteration algorithm is contractive.
In this paper, we propose a learning algorithm to compute an equilibrium solution for discrete-
time mean-field games under the discounted cost optimality criterion. In the literature, the existence
of mean-field equilibria has been established for a very general class of discrete-time mean-field
game models under the discounted cost [32]. However, learning discrete-time mean-field games has
not been rigorously studied until recently. In [17], authors develop a Q-learning algorithm to obtain
mean-field equilibria for finite state-action mean-field games. The convergence analysis of this work
heavily depends on the contractive behaviour of the operators involved in the algorithm, which is
not proved but only stated as an assumption. However, it seems that these operators are proved to
be contractive only if the action space is convex and the system components satisfy some convexity
assumptions in terms of the action variable. Hence, with finite action spaces, it is probably not pos-
sible to establish that operators are contractive under mild assumptions. Therefore, this drawback
may restrain the applicability of the learning algorithm. In [12], authors establish a fictitious play
iterative learning algorithm for compact state-action mean-field games, where the dynamics of the
state and the one-stage cost function satisfy certain structure. They propose an error analysis of
the learning algorithm for the game model with deterministic state dynamics (no noise term in the
state dynamics). However, they do not precisely specify the conditions on the system components
under which the error bound between learned equilibrium and mean-field equilibrium converges to
zero. Reference [10] studies linear-quadratic mean-field control and establishes the convergence of
policy gradient algorithm. In [14], authors develop actor-critic algorithm to learn mean-field equi-
librium for linear-quadratic mean-field games. Reference [39] considers a mean-field game in which
agents can control their transition probabilities without any restriction. In this case, the action
space becomes the set of distributions on the state space. Using this specific structure, they can
transform mean-field game into an equivalent deterministic Markov decision process by enlarging
the state and action spaces, and then, apply classical reinforcement learning algorithms to compute
mean-field equilibrium. In [11], a similar analysis is applied to mean-field control problems and
authors establish the convergence of the Q-learning algorithm for deterministic systems.
In this paper, we consider a discrete-time mean-field game with stochastic non-linear state dy-
namics, where the state space is a finite set and action space is a compact subset of finite dimensional
Euclidean space. Using fitted Q-iteration, we develop a learning algorithm to compute approximate
mean-field equilibrium. We first establish the error analysis of the learning algorithm using pseudo-
dimension of the function class on which Q-functions live. Then, using this error analysis, we prove
that learned mean-field equilibrium constitutes an approximate Nash equilibrium for finite-agent
games if the number of agents is sufficiently large.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the mean-field game and define the
mean-field equilibrium. In Section 2.1, we formulate the finite-agent version of the game problem.
In Section 3, we propose a Q-iteration algorithm when the model is known. In Section 4 we
propose and do the error analysis of fitted Q-learning algorithm for unknown model and prove
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that learned mean-field equilibrium constitutes an approximate Nash equilibrium for finite-agent
games. Section 5 concludes the paper.
Notation. For a finite set E, we let P(E) and M(E) denote the set of all probability distributions
on E and the set of real-valued functions on E, respectively. In this paper, P(E) is always endowed
with l1-norm ‖ · ‖1. We let m(·) denote the Lebesgue measure on appropriate finite dimensional
Euclidean space Rd. For any a∈Rd and ρ > 0, let B(a, ρ) := {b : ‖a−b‖ ≤ ρ}, where ‖·‖ denotes the
Euclidean norm. Let Q : E1 × E2→ R, where E1 and E2 are two sets. Then, we define Qmin(e1) :=
infe2∈E2 Q(e1, e2). The notation v∼ ν means that the random element v has distribution ν.
2. Mean-field games and mean-field equilibria
In this paper, we consider a discrete-time mean-field game with state space X and action space A.
Here, X is a finite set with the discrete metric dX(x, y) = 1{x 6=y} and A is a compact subset of a finite
dimensional Euclidean space RdimA equipped with the Euclidean norm ‖ · ‖. The state dynamics
evolve according to the transition probability p :X×A×P(X)→P(X); that is, given current state
x(t), action a(t), and state-measure µ, the next state x(t+1) is distributed as follows:
x(t+1)∼ p(·|x(t), a(t), µ).
In this model, a policy π is a conditional distribution on A given X. Let Π denote the set of all
policies.
Although we name this model as mean-field game, it is indeed neither a game nor a Markov
decision process (MDP) in the strict sense. This model is in between them. Similar to the MDP
model, we have a single agent with a Markovian dynamics that has an objective function to
minimize. However, similar to the game model, this agent should also compete with the collective
behaviour of other agents. We model this collective behaviour by an exogenous state-measure
µ∈P(X). By law of large numbers, this measure µ should be consistent with the state distribution
of this single agent when agent applies its optimal policy. The precise mathematical description of
the problem is given as follows.
If we fix a state-measure µ∈P(X), which represents the collective behavior of the other agents,
a policy π∗ ∈Π of a generic agent is optimal for µ if
Jµ(π
∗) = inf
pi∈Π
Jµ(π),
where
Jµ(π) =E
pi
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtc(x(t), a(t), µ)
]
,
is the discounted cost of policy π under the state-measure µ and the measurable function c :X×A×
P(X)→ [0,∞) is the one-stage cost function. Here, β ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor. Given µ∈P(X),
the evolution of the states and actions is governed by transition probability p :X×A×P(X)→P(X),
policy π :X→P(A), and initial distribution µ0 of the state; that is,
x(0)∼ µ0, x(t)∼ p( · |x(t− 1), a(t− 1), µ), t≥ 1,
a(t)∼ π( · |x(t)), t≥ 0.
With these definitions, we can now define the optimality criteria of the model. To this end, we
need to define two set-valued mappings.
We define the first set-valued mapping Ψ :P(X)→ 2Π as follows:
Ψ(µ) = {π ∈Π : π is optimal for µ and µ0= µ}.
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Given µ, the set Ψ(µ) is the set of optimal policies for µ when the initial distribution is µ as well.
Now, we define the second set-valued mapping Λ : Π→ 2P(X) as follows: for any π ∈ Π, the
state-measure µpi ∈ Λ(π) if it is an invariant distribution of the transition probability P (·|x) =∫
A
p( · |x,a,µpi)π(da|x); that is,
µpi( · ) =
∫
X×A
p( · |x,a,µpi)π(da|x)µpi(dx).
If there is no assumption on the transition probability p : X × A × P(X)→ P(X), we may have
Λ(π) = ∅ for some π. However, under Assumption 2.1 below, we always have non-empty Λ(π).
We can now define the notion of equilibrium for mean-field games via these mappings Ψ, Λ as
follows.
Definition 2.1. A pair (π∗, µ∗) ∈Π×P(X) is a mean-field equilibrium if π∗ ∈Ψ(µ∗) and µ∗ ∈
Λ(π∗).
In the literature, the existence of mean-field equilibria has been established for the discounted cost
in [32]. In this paper, our goal is to develop a Q-learning algorithm for computing an approximate
mean-field equilibrium under the model-free set-up. To that end, we define the following.
Definition 2.2. Let (π∗, µ∗) ∈Π×P(X) be a mean-field equilibrium. A pair (πε, µ∗)∈Π×P(X)
is an ε-mean-field equilibrium if
Jµ∗(πε)<min
pi∈Π
Jµ∗(π)+ ε= Jµ∗(π∗)+ ε;
that is, instead of optimality, we require that πε is ε-optimal.
With this definition, our goal now is to learn an ε-mean-field equilibrium using Q-learning algo-
rithm. To this end, we will impose certain assumptions on the components of the mean-field game
model. Before doing this, we need to define F :X×M(X)×P(X)×A→R as
F :X×M(X)×P(X)×A∋ (x, v,µ, a) 7→ c(x,a,µ)+β
∑
y∈X
v(y)p(y|x,a,µ)∈R.
Recall thatM(X) denotes the set of real-valued functions on X. We may now state our assumptions.
Assumption 2.1.
(a) The one-stage cost function c satisfies the following Lipschitz bound:
sup
x∈X
|c(x,a,µ)− c(x, aˆ, µˆ)| ≤L1 (‖a− aˆ‖+ ‖µ− µˆ‖1) , ∀µ, µˆ,∀a, aˆ.
(b) The stochastic kernel p( · |x,a,µ) satisfies the following Lipschitz bounds:
sup
x∈X
‖(p(·|x,a,µ)− p(·|x, aˆ, µˆ)‖1 ≤K1 (‖a− aˆ‖+ ‖µ− µˆ‖1) ,∀µ, µˆ,∀a, aˆ,
sup
µ∈P(X)
‖p(·|x,a,µ)− p(·|xˆ, aˆ, µ)‖1 ≤K2 (dX(x, xˆ)+ ‖a− aˆ‖) , ∀x, xˆ,∀a, aˆ.
(c) A is convex. Moreover, there exists α> 0 such that for any a∈A and ρ > 0, we have
m (B(a, ρ)∩A)≥min{αm(B(a, ρ)),m(A)} .
(d) For any v ∈M(X), µ ∈ P(X), and x ∈ X, F (x, v,µ, ·) is ρ-strongly convex and λ-smooth.
Moreover, the gradient ∇F (x, v,µ, a) : X×M(X)×P(X)×A→Rd satisfies the following Lipschitz
bound:
sup
a∈A
‖∇F (x, v,µ, a)−∇F (xˆ, vˆ, µˆ, a)‖ ≤KF (dX(x, xˆ)+ ‖v− vˆ‖∞+ ‖µ− µˆ‖1) ,
for every x, xˆ, v, vˆ, µ, and µˆ.
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Let us motivate these conditions. First, conditions (a) and (b) are standard assumptions in
MDP theory to obtain a rate of convergence bound for Q-learning algorithm. Condition (c) is
needed to bound l∞-norm with l2-norm of Lipschitz continuous functions on A. Condition (d) is
imposed to control the effect of the state-measure µ on the optimal policy. Indeed, this condition
is equivalent to the standard assumption that guarantees Lipschitz continuity, with respect to
unknown parameters, of the optimal solutions of the convex optimization problems [7, Theorem
4.51].
2.1. Finite Agent Game
The mean-field game model defined in Section 2 is indeed the infinite-agent version of the finite-
agent game model with mean-field interactions, which will be described in this section. In this
model, there are N -agents and, for every time step t∈ {0,1,2, . . .} and every agent i∈ {1,2, . . . ,N},
xNi (t)∈X and aNi (t)∈A denote the state and the action of Agent i at time t, respectively. Moreover,
e(N)t ( · ) :=
1
N
N∑
i=1
δxN
i
(t)( · )∈P(X)
denote the empirical distribution of the states of agents at time t, where δx ∈ P(X) is the Dirac
measure at x. For each t ≥ 0, next states (xN1 (t+ 1), . . . , xNN (t+ 1)) of agents have the following
conditional distribution given current states (xN1 (t), . . . , x
N
N(t)) and actions (a
N
1 (t), . . . , a
N
N(t)):
N∏
i=1
p
(
dxNi (t+1)
∣∣xNi (t), aNi (t), e(N)t ).
A policy π for a generic agent in this model is a conditional distribution on A given X; that is,
agents can only use their individual states to design their actions. The set of all policies for Agent i
is denoted by Πi. The initial states x
N
i (0) are independent and identically distributed according to
µ0.
We let pi(N) := (π1, . . . , πN), πi ∈Πi, denote an N -tuple of policies for all the agents in the game.
Under such an N -tuple of policies, for Agent i, the discounted cost is given by
J (N)i (pi
(N)) =Epi
(N)
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtc(xNi (t), a
N
i (t), e
(N)
t )
]
.
The Nash equilibrium is defined for the finite-agent game model as follows.
Definition 2.3. An N -tuple of policies pi(N∗)= (π1∗, . . . , πN∗) constitutes a Nash equilibrium if
J
(N)
i (pi
(N∗)) = inf
pii∈Πi
J
(N)
i (pi
(N∗)
−i , π
i)
for each i= 1, . . . ,N , where pi
(N∗)
−i := (π
j∗)j 6=i.
We note that proving the existence of Nash equilibria is in general prohibitive for finite-agent
game model due to the (almost) decentralized nature of the information structure of the problem
(see [32, pp. 4259]). Therefore, it is of interest to seek an approximate Nash equilibrium, whose
definition is given below.
Definition 2.4. An N -tuple of policies pi(N∗)= (π1∗, . . . , πN∗) constitutes an ǫ-Nash equilibrium
if
J
(N)
i (pi
(N∗))≤ inf
pii∈Πi
J
(N)
i (pi
(N∗)
−i , π
i)+ ǫ
for each i= 1, . . . ,N , where pi(N∗)−i := (π
j∗)j 6=i.
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In finite-agent mean-field game model, if the number of agents is large enough, one can prove
the existence of ǫ-Nash equilibrium by studying the infinite-agent limit N →∞ of the game (i.e.,
mean-field game). In the infinite-agent case, the empirical distribution of the states can be modelled
as an exogenous state-measure, which should be consistent with the distribution of a generic agent
by the law of large numbers (i.e., mean-field equilibrium); that is, a generic agent should solve the
mean-field game that is introduced in the preceding section. Then, it is possible to prove that if
each agent in the finite-agent N game problem adopts the policy in mean-field equilibrium, the
resulting N -tuple of policies will be an approximate Nash equilibrium for all sufficiently large N .
This is indeed stated in the following theorem, which was proved in [32].
Theorem 2.1. Let (π∗, µ∗) be a mean-field equilibrium. Then, for any ǫ > 0, there exists a
positive integer N(ǫ), such that, for each N ≥N(ǫ), the N-tuple of policies pi(N) = {π∗, π∗, . . . , π∗}
is an ǫ-Nash equilibrium for the game with N agents.
Proof. Note that, under Assumption 2.1, our model satisfies the conditions in [32, Assumptions 1,
2, and (j)]. Then, result follows by [32, Theorem 4.1]. 
Note that it is also possible to prove that if each agent in the finite-agent game model adopts the
ε-mean-field equilibrium policy, the resulting policy will be also an approximate Nash equilibrium
for all sufficiently large N -agent game models. Indeed, this is the statement of the next theorem.
Theorem 2.2. Let (πε, µ∗) be an ε-mean-field equilibrium. Then, for any ǫ > 0, there exists a
positive integer N(ǫ), such that, for each N ≥N(ǫ), the N-tuple of policies pi(N) = {πε, πε, . . . , πε}
is an ε+ ǫ-Nash equilibrium for the game with N agents.
Proof. For sufficiently large N , we need to prove that
J
(N)
i (pi
(N))≤ inf
pii∈Πi
J
(N)
i (pi
(N)
−i , π
i)+ ε+ ǫ (2.1)
for each i = 1, . . . ,N . Since the transition probabilities and the one-stage cost functions are the
same for all agents, it is sufficient to prove (2.1) for Agent 1 only. Given ǫ > 0, for each N ≥ 1, let
π˜(N) ∈Π1 be such that
J
(N)
1 (π˜
(N), πε, . . . , πε)< inf
pi′∈Π1
J
(N)
1 (π
′, πε, . . . , πε)+
ǫ
3
.
Then, by [32, Corollary 4.11], we have
lim
N→∞
J
(N)
1 (π˜
(N), πε, . . . , πε) = lim
N→∞
Jµ∗(π˜
(N))
≥ inf
pi′
Jµ∗(π
′)
≥ Jµ∗(πε)− ε
= lim
N→∞
J (N)1 (πε, πε, . . . , πε)− ε.
Therefore, there exists N(ǫ) such that
inf
pi′∈Π1
J
(N)
1 (π
′, πε, . . . , πε)+ ǫ+ ε > J
(N)
1 (π˜
(N), πε, . . . , πε)+
2ǫ
3
+ ε
≥ Jµ∗(πε)+
ǫ
3
≥ J (N)1 (πε, πε, . . . , πε).
for all N ≥N(ǫ). 
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Theorem 2.2 implies that, by learning ε-mean-field equilibrium in the infinite-agent limit, one
can obtain an approximate Nash equilibrium for the original finite-agent game problem for which
computing or learning the exact Nash equilibrium is in general prohibitive.
In the next section, we will first develop and study the convergence of an algorithm developed
for exact computation of the mean-field equilibrium for infinite-agent game model. Then, we adopt
this algorithm to the model-free setting and establish a learning algorithm to learn ε-mean-field
equilibrium. Note that, by Theorem 2.2, the policy in the learned ε-mean-field equilibrium still
constitutes an approximate Nash equilibrium for finite-agent game model.
3. Algorithm for Known Model
In this section, we develop a Q-iteration algorithm to compute a mean-field equilibrium (π∗, µ∗).
To that end, in addition to Assumption 2.1, we assume the following. But, before that let us define
the constants:
cmax := sup
(x,a)∈X×A
|c(x,a)|, Qmax := cmax
1−β , QLip :=L1+βQmaxK1. (3.1)
Assumption 3.1. We assume that
K1+K2+
KF
ρ
(
K2+K1
L1+βQmaxK1
1−β +K1
)
< 1.
This assumption is used to ensure that the operator in Q-iteration is contractive, which enables
us to use Banach fixed point theorem.
Note that, given any state-measure µ, the value function Jµ of policy π with initial state x is
given by
Jµ(π,x) :=E
pi
[ ∞∑
t=0
βtc(x(t), a(t), µ)
∣∣∣∣x(0) = x
]
.
Then, the optimal value function is defined as J∗µ(x) := infpi∈Π Jµ(π,x). Using J
∗
µ, we can characterize
the set of optimal policies Ψ(µ) for µ as follows. Firstly, J∗µ(x) is the unique fixed point of the
Bellman optimality operator Tµ, which is β-contractive with respect to ‖ · ‖∞-norm:
J∗µ(x) =min
a∈A
[
c(x,a,µ)+β
∑
y∈X
J∗µ(y)p(y|x,a,µ)
]
=: TµJ
∗
µ(x).
Additionally, if f ∗ :X→A attains the minimum in the equation above as follows
min
a∈A
[
c(x,a,µ)+β
∑
y∈X
J∗µ(y)p(y|x,a,µ)
]
= c(x, f ∗(x), µ)+β
∑
y∈X
J∗µ(y)p(y|x, f ∗(x), µ), (3.2)
then the policy π∗(a|x) = δf∗(x)(a) is optimal. We refer the reader to [19, Chapter 4] and [20,
Chapter 8] for these classical results in MDP theory.
We can also obtain a similar characterization by using Q-function instead of optimal value
function J∗µ. Indeed, we define the optimal Q-function as
Q∗µ(x,a) = c(x,a,µ)+β
∑
y∈X
J∗µ(y)p(y|x,a,µ).
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Note that Q∗µ,min(x) := mina∈AQ
∗
µ(x,a) = J
∗
µ(x) for all x ∈ X, and so, we can write the equation
above as:
Q∗µ(x,a) = c(x,a,µ)+β
∑
y∈X
Q∗µ,min(y)p(y|x,a,µ) =:HµQ∗µ(x,a),
where Hµ is the Bellman optimality operator for Q-functions. It is straightforward to prove that
Hµ is a ‖ · ‖∞-contraction with modulus β and the unique fixed point of Hµ is Q∗µ. Hence, we can
develop a Q-iteration algorithm to compute Q∗µ, and using Q
∗
µ we can obtain the optimal policy.
The advantage of this algorithm is that one can adapt this algorithm to the model-free setting via
Q-learning.
Before, we state the Q-iteration algorithm for computing a mean-field equilibrium (π∗, µ∗), let us
first define the set, on which Q-functions live, in Q-iteration. This set C is the set of all Q-functions
Q :X×A→R such that ‖Q‖∞ ≤Qmax, Q(x, ·) is QLip-Lipschitz, ρ-strongly convex, and λ-smooth
for all x, and the gradient ∇Q(x,a) satisfies the bound
sup
a∈A
‖∇Q(x,a)−∇Q(xˆ, a)‖ ≤KF , ∀x, xˆ.
Let us define H1 :P(X)→C as H1(µ) =Q∗µ (optimal Q-function) and H2 :P(X)×C→P(X) as
H2(µ,Q)(·) :=
∑
x∈X
p(·|x, fQ(x), µ)µ(x),
where fQ(x) := argmina∈AQ(x,a) is the unique minimizer by ρ-strong convexity of Q, for any
Q∈ C. Now, we can give the definition of the mean-field equilibrium (MFE) operator as follows:
H :P(X)∋ µ 7→H2 (µ,H1(µ))∈P(X).
Our goal is to obtain mean-field equilibrium by iteratively applying the MFE operator H. To
this end, we need to prove that H is contractive. In the following lemma, we prove that H1 is
contractive, which will later imply that H operator is also contractive.
Lemma 3.1. The mapping H1 is a contraction with contraction constant KH1 :=
L1+βQmaxK1
1−β .
Proof. First of all, H1 is a well-defined function; that is, it maps any µ into C. Indeed, recall that
Q∗µ is the fixed point of the contractive operator Hµ which is given as
HµQ(x,a) = c(x,a,µ)+β
∑
y∈X
Qmin(y)p(y|x,a,µ).
Using Assumption 2.1-(a),(b),(d), it is straightforward to prove that Hµ maps any continuous
Q :X×A→R into C. Hence, the fixed point Q∗µ of Hµ must be in C.
Now, we prove that H1 is KH1-contractive. For any µ, µˆ∈P(X), we have
‖H1(µ)−H1(µˆ)‖∞ = ‖Q∗µ−Q∗µˆ‖∞
= sup
x,a
∣∣∣∣∣c(x,a,µ)+β
∑
y
Q∗µ,min(y)p(y|x,a,µ)− c(x,a, µˆ)−β
∑
y
Q∗µˆ,min(y)p(y|x,a, µˆ)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤L1 ‖µ− µˆ‖1+β
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
y
Q∗µ,min(y)p(y|x,a,µ)−
∑
y
Q∗µ,min(y)p(y|x,a, µˆ)
∣∣∣∣∣
+β
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
y
Q∗µ,min(y)p(y|x,a, µˆ)−
∑
y
Q∗µˆ,min(y)p(y|x,a, µˆ)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤L1 ‖µ− µˆ‖1+βQmaxK1 ‖µ− µˆ‖1+β ‖Q∗µ−Q∗µˆ‖∞.
This completes the proof. 
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Now, using Lemma 3.1, we can prove that H is contractive.
Proposition 3.1. The mapping H is a contraction with contraction constant KH , where
KH :=K1+K2+
KF
ρ
(K2+K1KH1 +K1) .
Proof. This result can be proved by following the same line of analysis in [2, Theorem 3.2].
However, for the sake of completeness, we give the full proof here.
Fix any µ, µˆ ∈P(X). Note that, by Q∗µ =HµQ∗µ, the mapping fQ∗µ(x) is the unique minimizer of
F (x,Q∗µ,min, µ, ·). Similarly, fQ∗µˆ(y) is the unique minimizer of F (y,Q∗µˆ,min, µ, ·). For any x, y ∈X, we
define
a= fQ∗µ(x)
and
r= fQ∗
µˆ
(y)− fQ∗µ(x).
As a= fQ∗µ(x) is the unique minimizer of a strongly convex function F (x,Q
∗
µ,min, µ, ·), we have
∇F
(
x,Q∗µ,min, µ, fQ∗µ(x)
)
= 0.
This is also true for a+ r= fQ∗
µˆ
(y) and F (y,Q∗µˆ,min, µˆ, ·). Therefore, by ρ-strong convexity of F in
Assumption 2.1-(d) and [18, Lemma 3.2], we have
−∇F (y,Q∗µˆ,min, µˆ, a)T · r=−∇F (y,Q∗µˆ,min, µˆ, a)T · r+∇F (y,Q∗µˆ,min, µˆ, a+ r)T · r
≥ ρ‖r‖2. (3.3)
Similarly, by Assumption 2.1-(d), we also have
−∇F (y,Q∗µˆ,min, µˆ, a)T · r=−∇F (y,Q∗µˆ,min, µˆ, a)T · r+∇F (x,Q∗µ,min, µ, a)T · r
≤ ‖r‖‖∇F (x,Q∗µ,min, µ, a)−∇F (y,Q∗µˆ,min, µˆ, a)‖
≤KF ‖r‖
(
dX(x, y)+ ‖Q∗µ,min−Q∗µˆ,min‖∞+ ‖µ− µˆ‖1
)
≤KF ‖r‖
(
dX(x, y)+ ‖Q∗µ−Q∗µˆ‖∞+ ‖µ− µˆ‖1
)
. (3.4)
Combining (3.3) and (3.4) yields
‖fQ∗
µˆ
(y)− fQ∗µ(x)‖ ≤
KF
ρ
(
dX(x, y)+ ‖Q∗µ−Q∗µˆ‖∞+ ‖µ− µˆ‖1
)
(3.5)
=
KF
ρ
(dX(x, y)+ ‖H1(µ)−H1(µˆ)‖∞+ ‖µ− µˆ‖1)
≤ KF
ρ
(dX(x, y)+KH1‖µ− µˆ‖1+ ‖µ− µˆ‖1) .
Therefore, fQ∗µ(x) is Lipschitz continuous with respect to (x,µ).
Using (3.5), we have
‖H2(µ,H1(µ))−H2(µˆ,H1(µˆ))‖1
=
∑
y
∣∣∣∣∑
x
p(y|x, fQ∗µ(x), µ), µ)µ(x)
−
∑
x
p(y|x, fQ∗
µˆ
(x), µˆ) µˆ(x)
∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
y
∣∣∣∣∑
x
p(y|x, fQ∗µ(x), µ)µ(x)
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−
∑
x
p(y|x, fQ∗
µˆ
(x), µˆ)µ(x)
∣∣∣∣
+
∑
y
∣∣∣∣∑
x
p(y|x, fQ∗
µˆ
(x), µˆ)µ(x)
−
∑
x
p(y|x, fQ∗
µˆ
(x), µˆ) µˆ(x)
∣∣∣∣
(1)
≤
∑
x
∥∥∥p(·|x, fQ∗µ(x), µ)− p(·|x, fQ∗µˆ(x), µˆ)
∥∥∥
1
µ(x)
+
K2
2
(
1+
KF
ρ
)
‖µ− µˆ‖1
≤K1
(
‖fQ∗µ(x)− fQ∗µˆ(x)‖+ ‖µ− µˆ‖1
)
+
K2
2
(
1+
KF
ρ
)
‖µ− µˆ‖1
≤KH ‖µ− µˆ‖1. (3.6)
Note that (3.5) and Assumption 2.1-(b) lead to
‖p(·|x, fQ∗
µˆ
(x), µˆ)− p(·|y, fQ∗
µˆ
(y), µˆ)‖1 ≤K2
(
1+
KF
ρ
)
.
Hence, (1) follows from [24, Lemma A2]. This completes the proof. 
Now, we know that, under Assumption 2.1 and Assumption 3.1, H is a contraction mapping.
Therefore, by Banach Fixed Point Theorem, we can conclude that the following Q-iteration algo-
rithm converges to the fixed point of H. Using the fixed point of H, we can then easily construct
a mean-field equilibrium as stated in the theorem below.
Algorithm 1 Q-Iteration Algorithm
Start with µ0
while µn 6= µn−1 do
µn+1 =H(µn)
end while
return Fixed-point µ∗ of H and Q
∗
µ∗
=H1(µ∗)
Theorem 3.1. Let (µ∗,Q
∗
µ∗
) be the output of the above Q-iteration algorithm. Construct the
policy π∗(a|x) = δfQ∗µ∗ (x)(a). Then, the pair (π∗, µ∗) is a mean-field equilibrium.
Proof. Note that (µ∗,Q
∗
µ∗
) satisfy the following
µ∗(·) =
∑
x∈X
p(·|x,a,µ∗)π∗(a|x)µ∗(x), (3.7)
Q∗µ∗(x,a) = c(x,a,µ∗)+β
∑
y∈X
Q∗µ∗,min(y)p(y|x,a,µ∗). (3.8)
Here, (3.8) implies that π∗ ∈Ψ(µ∗) and (3.7) implies that µ∗ ∈Λ(π∗). Hence, (π∗, µ∗) is a mean-field
equilibrium. 
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3.1. Auxiliary Results
In the next section, we adopt the Q-iteration algorithm introduced in the preceding section to the
model-free set-up. However, before doing so, we need to state and prove some auxiliary results that
will be needed in the analysis of model-free learning algorithm.
Let mA(·) :=m(·)/m(A) be the uniform probability measure on A and let ν be some arbitrary
probability measure on X. Then, for any g :X×A→R, we define its l2-norm as follows
‖g‖2ν :=
∑
x∈X
∫
A
g(x,a)2mA(da) ν(x).
The first result gives a bound on l∞-norm in terms of l2-norm for uniformly Lipschitz continuous
functions g with respect to a.
Lemma 3.2. Let g : X×A→R be a uniformly Lipschitz continuous function in terms of a with
Lipschitz constant L. Then, we have
‖g‖∞ ≤max
([
m(A) (dimA+1)!
α (2/L)dimA
‖g‖ν
]1/(dimA+1)
, (dimA+1)‖g‖ν
)
,
where α> 0 is the constant in Assumption 2.1-(c).
Proof. Under Assumption 2.1-(c), the result can be proved following the same steps as in the
proof of [3, Lemma D.2]. Hence, we omit the details. 
Remark 3.1. In the remainder of this paper, to simplify the notation, we will always assume
that [
m(A) (dimA+1)!
α (2/L)dimA
‖g‖ν
]1/(dimA+1)
≥ (dimA+1)‖g‖ν .
Therefore, the bound in Lemma 3.2 will always be in the following form:
‖g‖∞ ≤
[
m(A) (dimA+1)!
α (2/L)dimA
‖g‖ν
]1/(dimA+1)
.
Before we state the next result, we need to give some definitions. Let E be some set. Let G be
a set of real-valued functions on E taking values in [0,K]. For any e1:N := {ei}Ni=1 ∈ EN , define the
following semi-metric on G:
de1:N (g,h) :=
1
N
N∑
i=1
|g(ei)−h(ei)|.
Then, for any ε > 0, let N1 (ε,{ei}Ni=1,G) denote the ε-covering number of G in terms of semi-
metric de1:N [36, pp. 14]. Moreover, let VG denote the pseudo-dimension of the function class G [36,
Definition 4.2, pp. 120].
Lemma 3.3. [3, Proposition E.3] For any e1:N , we have
N1
(
ε,{ei}Ni=1,G
)≤ e (VG +1)
(
2eK
ε
)VG
.
We now give the last auxiliary result. This result states that if the function Q is close to the
optimal Q-function Q∗µ for some µ, then the cost function of the minimizer of Q is also close to the
optimal value function J∗µ.
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Proposition 3.2. For any µ∈P(X), let Q∗µ =H1(µ); that is,
Q∗µ(x,a) = c(x,a,µ)+β
∑
y∈X
Q∗µ,min(y)p(y|x,a,µ) =:HµQ∗µ(x,a).
Let Q be such that ‖Q−Q∗µ‖∞ ≤ ε. If we define π(x) = fQ(x), then ‖J∗µ(·)− Jµ(π, ·)‖∞ ≤ 2ε1−β .
Proof. Let us define the operator Hpi on Q-functions as
HpiQ
′(x,a) := c(x,a,µ)+β
∑
y∈X
Q′(y,π(y))p(y|x,a,µ)
Then, it is straightforward to prove thatHpi is β-contractive with a unique fixed pointQpi. Moreover,
the cost function Jµ(π, ·) of π is given by
Jµ(π,x) =Qpi(x,π(x)).
Using these facts, we can now prove the proposition. First, we observe that
‖Q∗µ−Qpi‖∞ ≤ ‖HµQ∗µ−HpiQ∗µ‖∞+ ‖HpiQ∗µ−HpiQpi‖∞
≤ ‖HµQ∗µ−HpiQ∗µ‖∞+β ‖Q∗µ−Qpi‖∞.
This yields ‖Q∗µ−Qpi‖∞ ≤ ‖HµQ∗µ−HpiQ∗µ‖∞/(1−β). Moreover, we have
‖HµQ∗µ−HpiQ∗µ‖∞
= sup
x,a
∣∣∣∣∣β
∑
y∈X
Q∗µ,min(y)p(y|x,a,µ)−β
∑
y∈X
Q∗µ(y,π(y))p(y|x,a,µ)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤ sup
x,a
β
∑
y∈X
p(y|x,a,µ) (|Q∗µ,min(y)−Qmin(y)|+ |Q(y,π(y))−Q∗µ(y,π(y))|)
≤ 2β ‖Q−Q∗µ‖∞ ≤ 2βε.
This implies that ‖Q∗µ−Qpi‖∞ ≤ 2βε1−β . Using this result, we can complete the proof as follows
‖J∗µ − Jµ(π)‖∞ = sup
x
|Q∗µ,min(x)−Qpi(x,π(x))|
≤ sup
x
|Q∗µ,min(x)−Qmin(x)|+sup
x
|Q(x,π(x))−Q∗µ(x,π(x))|
+sup
x
|Q∗µ(x,π(x))−Qpi(x,π(x))|
≤ 2‖Q∗µ−Q‖∞+ ‖Q∗µ−Qpi‖∞
≤ 2ε
1−β .

4. Algorithm for Unknown Model
In this section, we develop a Q-learning algorithm to learn approximate mean-field equilibrium.
In this learning algorithm, in each iteration we have two stages. In the first stage, we learn the
optimal Q-function Q∗µ for a given µ using fitted Q-learning algorithm [4]. This stage replaces the
operatorH1 in the model-based algorithm with a random operator Hˆ1 that will be described below.
In this stage, we pick Q-functions from a fixed function class F ⊂ C. This function class F can
be chosen as the set of neural networks with some fixed architecture or linear span of some finite
number of basis functions or the set C itself. Depending on this choice, there will be an additional
representation error in the learning algorithm. Let Fmin := {Qmin :Q∈F}.
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In the second stage, we update the state-measure by learning corresponding transition probability
via simulation. This stage replaces the operator H2 in the model-based algorithm with a random
operator Hˆ2. Below, we give the overall description of the algorithm first, and then, the descriptions
of the stage 1 and the stage 2 along with their error analysis, respectively.
Algorithm 2 Fitted Q Iteration
Inputs
(
K,{[Nk,Lk]}Kk=0,{Mk}K−1k=0 , µ0
)
Start with µ0
for k=0, . . . ,K − 1 do
µk+1 = Hˆ ([Nk,Lk],Mk) (µk) := Hˆ2[Mk]
(
µk, Hˆ1[Nk,Lk](µk)
)
end for
return µK and QK = Hˆ1([NK ,LK ])(µK)
In the algorithm above, we have two random operators Hˆ1 and Hˆ2. To describe Hˆ1, we need to
give some definitions. Let us choose a probability measure ν on X. For instance, one can choose ν
as the uniform distribution over X. We fix some policy πb such that, for any x∈X, the distribution
πb(·|x) on A has a density with respect to Lebesgue measurem. To simplify the notation, we denote
this density with πb(a|x) as well. We assume that π0 := inf(x,a)∈X×Aπb(a|x)> 0.
Now, we can give the definition of the random operator Hˆ1.
Algorithm 3 Algorithm Hˆ1
Inputs ([N,L], µ)
Start with Q0 = 0
for l= 0, . . . ,L− 1 do
generate i.i.d. samples {(xt, at, ct, yt+1)Nt=1} using
xt ∼ ν, at ∼ πb(·|xt), ct= c(xt, at, µ), yt+1 ∼ p(·|xt, at, µ)
and set
Ql+1 =argmin
f∈F
1
N
N∑
t=1
1
m(A)πb(at|xt)
∣∣∣∣f(xt, at)−
[
ct+βmin
a′∈A
Ql(yt+1, a
′)
]∣∣∣∣
2
end for
return QL
Before we describe the second stage Hˆ2, we do the error analysis of algorithm Hˆ1. To this end,
we need to define the following constants:
E(F) := sup
µ∈P(X)
sup
Q∈F
inf
Q′∈F
‖Q′−HµQ‖ν
Lmax := (1+β)Qmax+ cmax, C :=
L2max
m(A)π0
Υ= 8 e2 (VF +1) (VFmin +1)
(
64eQmaxLmax(1+β)
m(A)π0
)VF+VFmin
V = VF +VFmin , γ =512C
2
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∆ :=
1
1−β
[
m(A)(dimA+1)!
α(2/QLip)dimA
E(F)
] 1
dim
A
+1
Λ :=
1
1−β
[
m(A)(dimA+1)!
α(2/QLip)dimA
] 1
dimA +1
.
Remark 4.1. Since X is finite and C satisfies various regularity conditions, it is possible to prove
that pseudo-dimensions of VC and VCmin are finite. Hence, we can pick F = C. In this case, we can
avoid representation error E(F), i.e., E(F) = 0. Otherwise, there will be a constant representation
error in the learning algorithm. For instance, if one chooses to use neural networks or linear span
of some finite number of basis functions, then E(F) may be small but positive.
The following theorem gives the error analysis of the algorithm Hˆ1.
Theorem 4.1. For any (ε, δ)∈ (0,1)2, with probability at least 1− δ, we have∥∥∥Hˆ1[N,L](µ)−H1(µ)∥∥∥
∞
≤ ε+∆
if β
L
1−β
Qmax<
ε
2
and N ≥m1(ǫ, δ,L), where
m1(ε, δ,L) :=
γ(2Λ)4(dimA+1)
ε4(dimA+1)
ln
(
Υ(2Λ)2V (dimA+1)L
δε2V (dimA+1)
)
.
Here, the constant error ∆ is as a result of the representation error E(F) in the algorithm.
Proof. We mimic the error analysis developed in [3, Theorem 4.4], but for the case of i.i.d.
generated samples. Therefore, our analysis is much more simpler and for the sake of completeness,
we give the full proof here.
For any real-valued function Q(x,a), recall the definition
‖Q‖2ν :=
∑
x∈X
∫
A
Q(x,a)2mA(da) ν(x).
Let Ql be the random Q-function at the l
th-step of the algorithm. First, we find an upper bound
to the following probability
P0 := P
(‖Ql+1−HµQl‖2ν >E(F)2+ ε′) ,
for a given ε′ > 0. To that end, we define
LˆN(f ;Q) :=
1
N
N∑
t=1
1
m(A)πb(at|xt)
∣∣∣∣f(xt, at)−
[
ct+βmin
a′∈A
Q(yt+1, a
′)
]∣∣∣∣
2
.
One can show that (see [3, Lemma 4.1])
E
[
LˆN(f ;Q)
]
= ‖f −HµQ‖2ν +L∗(Q) =:L(f ;Q),
where L∗(Q) is some quantity independent of f . Since we do not need L∗(Q) in the sequel, we do
not give the precise definition here. It is sufficient to know that it does not depend on the first
argument of L(f ;Q).
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Using above definitions, we can obtain the following bound
‖Ql+1−HµQl‖2ν −E(F)2 ≤‖Ql+1−HµQl‖2ν − inf
f∈F
‖f −HµQl‖2ν
=L(Ql+1;Ql)− inf
f∈F
L(f ;Ql)
=L(Ql+1;Ql)− LˆN(Ql+1;Ql)+ LˆN(Ql+1;Ql)− inf
f∈F
L(f ;Ql)
=L(Ql+1;Ql)− LˆN(Ql+1;Ql)+ inf
f∈F
LˆN(f ;Ql)− inf
f∈F
L(f ;Ql)
≤ 2 sup
f∈F
∣∣∣L(f ;Ql)− LˆN(f ;Ql)∣∣∣
≤ 2 sup
f,Q∈F
∣∣∣L(f ;Q)− LˆN(f ;Q)∣∣∣ .
This implies that
P0 ≤ P
(
sup
f,Q∈F
∣∣∣L(f ;Q)− LˆN(f ;Q)∣∣∣> ε′
2
)
. (4.1)
For any f,Q∈F , we define
lf,Q(x,a, c, y) :=
1
m(A)πb(a|x)
∣∣∣∣f(x,a)− c−mina′∈AQ(y, a′)
∣∣∣∣
2
.
Let LF := {lf,Q : f,Q∈F}. Note that {zt}Nt=1 := {(xt, at, ct, yt+1)}Nt=1 are i.i.d. and
1
N
N∑
t=1
lf,Q(zt) = LˆN (f ;Q) and E[lf,Q(z1)] =L(f ;Q).
Recall the constant Lmax := (1+ β)Qmax+ cmax. One can prove that 0≤ lf,Q ≤ L
2
max
m(A)pi0
=: C. Then,
by Pollard’s Tail Inequality [30, Theorem 24, p. 25], we have
P0 ≤ P
(
sup
f,Q∈F
∣∣∣∣∣ 1N
N∑
t=1
lf,Q(zt)−E[lf,Q(z1)]
∣∣∣∣∣> ε
′
2
)
≤ 8E
[
N1
(
ε′
16
,{zt}Nt=1,LF
)]
e
−N ε′2
512C2 .
For any lf,Q and lg,T , we have (see [3, pp. 18])
1
N
N∑
t=1
|lf,Q(zt)− lg,T (zt)| ≤ 2Lmax
m(A)π0
(
1
N
N∑
t=1
|f(xt, at)− g(xt, at)|
+β
1
N
N∑
t=1
∣∣∣∣minb∈A Q(yt+1, b)−minb∈A T (yt+1, b)
∣∣∣∣
)
.
This implies that, for any ǫ > 0, we have
N1
(
2Lmax
m(A)π0
(1+β) ǫ,{zt}Nt=1,LF
)
≤N1
(
ǫ,{(xt, at)}Nt=1,F
)
N1
(
ǫ,{yt+1}Nt=1,Fmin
)
(1)
≤ e (VF +1)
(
2eQmax
ǫ
)VF
e (VFmin +1)
(
2eQmax
ǫ
)VFmin
, (4.2)
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where (1) follows from Lemma 3.3. Therefore, we have the following bound on the probability P0:
P0 ≤ 8
{
e2 (VF +1) (VFmin +1)
(
64eQmaxLmax(1+β)
m(A)π0ε′
)VF+VFmin}
e
−N ε′2
512C2 . (4.3)
Recall the constants
Υ= 8 e2 (VF +1) (VFmin +1)
(
64eQmaxLmax(1+β)
m(A)π0
)VF+VFmin
,
V = VF +VFmin, γ = 512C
2.
Then, we can write (4.3) as follows
P0 ≤Υ ε′−V e
−Nε′2
γ =:
δ′
L
. (4.4)
Hence, for each l= 0, . . . ,L− 1, with probability at most δ′
L
‖Ql+1−HµQl‖2ν > ε′+E(F)2.
This implies that with probability at most δ
′
L
‖Ql+1−HµQl‖ν >
√
ε′+E(F).
Using this, we can conclude that with probability at least 1− δ′
‖QL−H1(µ)‖∞ ≤
L−1∑
l=0
βL−(l+1) ‖Ql+1−HµQl‖∞+ ‖HLµQ0−H1(µ)‖∞
(1)
≤
L−1∑
l=0
βL−(l+1)
[
m(A)(dimA+1)!
α(2/QLip)dimA
‖Ql+1−HµQl‖ν
] 1
dimA +1
+
βL
1−β Qmax
≤
L−1∑
l=0
βL−(l+1)
[
m(A)(dimA+1)!
α(2/QLip)dimA
(
√
ε′+E(F))
] 1
dimA +1
+
βL
1−β Qmax
≤ 1
1−β
([
m(A)(dimA+1)!
α(2/QLip)dimA
E(F)
] 1
dim
A
+1
+
[
m(A)(dimA+1)!
α(2/QLip)dimA
] 1
dim
A
+1
ε
′ 1
2(dim
A
+1)
)
+
βL
1−β Qmax,
where (1) follows from Lemma 3.2. Recall the constants
∆ :=
1
1−β
[
m(A)(dimA+1)!
α(2/QLip)dimA
E(F)
] 1
dim
A
+1
Λ :=
1
1−β
[
m(A)(dimA+1)!
α(2/QLip)dimA
] 1
dimA +1
(4.5)
Then, with probability at least 1− δ′, we have
‖QL−H1(µ)‖∞≤Λε′
1
2(dimA +1) +∆+
βL
1−β Qmax. (4.6)
Now, the result follows by picking δ = δ′ := LΥ ε′−V e
−Nε′2
γ (see (4.4)), Λε
′ 1
2(dim
A
+1) = ε/2, and
βL
1−β
Qmax = ε/2. 
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We now give the description of the random operator Hˆ2, and then, do the error analysis. In this
algorithm, the goal is to replace the operator H2 in the model-based algorithm, which gives the
next state-measure, with Hˆ2. We achieve this by simulating the transition probability p(·|x,a,µ)
for certain µ and policy π.
Algorithm 4 Algorithm Hˆ2
Inputs (M,µ,Q)
for x∈ X do
generate i.i.d. samples {yxt }Mt=1 using
yxt ∼ p(·|x, fQ(x), µ)
and define
pM(·|x, fQ(x), µ) = 1
M
M∑
t=1
δyxt (·).
end for
return
∑
x∈X pM(·|x, fQ(x), µ)µ(x)
Theorem 4.2. For any (ε, δ)∈ (0,1)2, with probability at least 1− δ∥∥∥Hˆ2[M ](µ,Q)−H2(µ,Q)∥∥∥
1
≤ ε
if M ≥m2(ǫ, δ), where
m2(ǫ, δ) :=
|X|2
ε2
ln
(
2 |X|2
δ
)
.
Proof. By Hoeffding Inequality [18, Theorem 2.1], for any x, y ∈X, we have
P
(
|pM(y|x, fQ(x), µ)− p(y|x, fQ(x), µ)|> ε|X|
)
≤ 2e
−Mε2
|X|2 .
Hence, we have
P
(∥∥∥Hˆ2[M ](µ,Q)−H2(µ,Q)∥∥∥
1
≤ ε
)
≥ P
(∑
x,y∈X
|pM(y|x, fQ(x), µ)− p(y|x, fQ(x), µ)| µ(x)≤ ε
)
≥ 1−P
(
∃x, y ∈X s.t. |pM(y|x, fQ(x), µ)− p(y|x, fQ(x), µ)|> ε|X| ,
)
≥ 1− 2 |X|2 e
−Mε2
|X|2 .
The result follows by picking δ = 2 |X|2 e
−Mε2
|X|2 . 
Now, we have completed the error analyses of the algorithms Hˆ1 and Hˆ2 in Theorem 4.1 and
Theorem 4.2, respectively. Since the overall algorithm Hˆ is a composition of Hˆ1 with Hˆ2, we can
obtain the following error analysis for the algorithm Hˆ. After we prove Theorem 4.3, we state the
main result of this paper as a corollary.
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Theorem 4.3. Fix any (ε, δ)∈ (0,1)2. Define
ε1 :=
ρ2 (1−KH)2 ε2
64λ(K1)2
, ε2 :=
(1−KH) ε
4
.
Let K,L be such that
(KH)
K
1−KH ≤
ε
2
,
βL
1−βQmax≤
ε1
2
.
Then, pick N,M such that
N ≥m1
(
ε1,
δ
2K
,L
)
, M ≥m2
(
ε2,
δ
2K
)
. (4.7)
Let (µK,QK) be the output of the fitted Q-learning algorithm Hˆ with inputs(
K,{[N,L]}Kk=0,{M}K−1k=0 , µ0
)
.
Then, with probability at least 1− δ
‖µK −µ∗‖1 ≤ 2K1
√
λ∆
ρ(1−KH) + ε,
where µ∗ is the state-measure in mean-field equilibrium. Moreover, with probability at least 1− δ2K
‖QK −H1(µK)‖∞ ≤ ε1+∆.
Proof. First of all, the last statement follows from Theorem 4.1. To prove the first statement,
note that for any µ∈P(X) and Q,Qˆ∈ C, we have
‖H2(µ,Q)−H2(µ, Qˆ)‖1
=
∑
y∈X
∣∣∣∣∣
∑
x∈X
p(y|x, fQ(x), µ)µ(x)−
∑
x∈X
p(y|x, fQˆ(x), µ)µ(x)
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
x∈X
‖p(·|x, fQ(x), µ)− p(·|x, fQˆ(x), µ)‖1µ(x)
≤
∑
x∈X
K1 ‖fQ(x)− fQˆ(x)‖µ(x). (4.8)
Note that the mapping fQ(x) is the unique minimizer of Q(x,a). Similarly, fQˆ(x) is the unique
minimizer of Qˆ. Let us set
a= fQ(x)
and
r= fQˆ(x)− fQ(x).
As a= fQ(x) is the unique minimizer of a strongly convex function Q(x,a), we have
∇Q (x, fQ(x)) = 0.
The same is true for a+ r = fQˆ(x) and Qˆ(x,a). Therefore, by strong convexity and [18, Lemma
3.2], we have
−∇Qˆ(x,a)T · r=−∇Qˆ(x,a)T · r+∇Qˆ(x,a+ r)T · r
≥ ρ‖r‖2. (4.9)
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We also have
−∇Qˆ(x,a)T · r=−∇Qˆ(x,a)T · r+∇Q(x,a)T · r
≤ ‖r‖‖∇Qˆ(x,a)−∇Q(x,a)‖ (4.10)
Combining (4.9) and (4.10) yields
‖fQˆ(x)− fQ(x)‖2≤
1
ρ2
‖∇Qˆ(x, fQ(x))−∇Q(x, fQ(x))‖2
=
1
ρ2
‖∇Qˆ(x, fQ(x))‖2
(1)
≤ 2λ
ρ2
(
Qˆ(x, fQ(x))− Qˆ(x, fQˆ(x))
)
=
2λ
ρ2
(
Qˆ(x, fQ(x))−Q(x, fQ(x))+Q(x, fQ(x))− Qˆ(x, fQˆ(x))
)
=
2λ
ρ2
(
Qˆ(x, fQ(x))−Q(x, fQ(x))+min
a∈A
Q(x,a)−min
a∈A
Qˆ(x,a)
)
≤ 4λ
ρ2
‖Q− Qˆ‖∞, (4.11)
where (1) follows from λ-smoothness and [18, Lemma 3.4-(b)]. Hence, combining (4.8) and (4.11)
yields
‖H2(µ,Q)−H2(µ, Qˆ)‖1 ≤ 2K1
√
λ
ρ
√
‖Q− Qˆ‖∞. (4.12)
Using (4.12), for any k=0, . . . ,K − 1, we have
‖H(µk)− Hˆ([N,L],M)(µk)‖1
≤‖H2(µk,H1(µk))−H2(µk, Hˆ1[N,L](µk))‖1
+ ‖H2(µk, Hˆ1[N,L](µk))− Hˆ2[M ](µk, Hˆ1[N,L](µk))‖1
≤ 2K1
√
λ
ρ
√
‖H1(µk)− Hˆ1[N,L](µk)‖∞
+ ‖H2(µk, Hˆ1[N,L](µk))− Hˆ2[M ](µk, Hˆ1[N,L](µk))‖1.
The last term is upper bounded by
2K1
√
λ(ε1+∆)
ρ
+ ε2
with probability at least 1− δ
K
by Theorem 4.1 and Theorem 4.2. Therefore, with probability at
least 1− δ
‖µK −µ∗‖1 ≤
K−1∑
k=0
KK−(k+1)H ‖Hˆ([N,L],M)(µk)−H(µk)‖1+ ‖HK(µ0)−µ∗‖1
≤
K−1∑
k=0
KK−(k+1)H
(
2K1
√
λ(ε1+∆)
ρ
+ ε2
)
+
(KH)
K
1−KH
≤ 2K1
√
λ∆
ρ(1−KH) + ε.
This completes the proof. 
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Now, we state the main result of this paper. It basically states that, by using fitted Q-learning
algorithm Hˆ, one can learn approximate Nash equilibrium for the original finite-agent game prob-
lem.
Corollary 4.1. Fix any (ε, δ)∈ (0,1)2. Suppose that K,L,N,M satisfy the conditions in The-
orem 4.3. Let (µK,QK) be the output of the fitted Q-learning algorithm Hˆ with inputs(
K,{[N,L]}Kk=0,{M}K−1k=0 , µ0
)
.
Define πK(x) := argmina∈AQK(x,a). Then, with probability at least 1− δ(1+ 12K ), the pair (πK, µ∗)
is a κ(ε,∆)-mean-field equilibrium, where
κ(ε,∆) := 2
1
1−β
(
ρ2 (1−KH)2 ε2
64λ(K1)2
+∆+KH1
(
2K1
√
λ∆
ρ(1−KH) + ε
))
.
Therefore, by Theorem 2.2, an N-tuple of policies π(N) = {πK , πK , . . . , πK} is an κ(ε,∆)+ ǫ-Nash
equilibrium for the game with N ≥N(ǫ) agents.
Proof. By Theorem 4.3, with probability at least 1− δ(1+ 1
2K
), we have
‖QK −H1(µ∗)‖∞ ≤‖QK −H1(µK)‖∞+ ‖H1(µK)−H1(µ∗)‖∞
≤ ε1+∆+KH1‖µK −µ∗‖1
≤ ε1+∆+KH1
(
2K1
√
λ∆
ρ(1−KH) + ε
)
=
ρ2 (1−KH)2 ε2
64λ(K1)2
+∆+KH1
(
2K1
√
λ∆
ρ(1−KH) + ε
)
.
Let πK(x) := argmina∈AQK(x,a). By Proposition 3.2, with probability at least 1− δ(1 + 12K ), we
have
‖Jµ∗(π∗, ·)− Jµ∗(πK, ·)‖∞
≤ 2 1
1−β
(
ρ2 (1−KH)2 ε2
64λ(K1)2
+∆+KH1
(
2K1
√
λ∆
ρ(1−KH) + ε
))
= κ(ε,∆).
Hence, (πK, µ∗) is κ(ε,∆)-mean-field equilibrium with probability at least 1− δ(1+ 12K ). 
Remark 4.2. Note that, in Corollary 4.1, there is a constant ∆, which depends on the repre-
sentation error E(F). If we choose the function class F as C, then there will be no representation
error, i.e, E(F) = 0, and so, ∆= 0. Hence, in this case, we have the following error bound:
κ(ε,0) := 2
1
1−β
(
ρ2 (1−KH)2 ε2
64λ(K1)2
+KH1ε
)
,
which goes to zero as ε→ 0.
5. Conclusion
This paper has established a fitted Q-iteration algorithm for discrete time mean-field games subject
to discounted cost criterion. Under certain regularity conditions on system components, we have
proved that the policy obtained from the algorithm converges to the policy in mean-field equilibrium
with some probabilistic convergence rate. We have then used the learned policy to construct an
approximate Nash equilibrium for finite agent game problem.
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